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CASE COMMENTS
OIL AND GAS-HABENDUm CLAUSE-ExERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE
ExTENDs THE LEASE BEYOND THE PRImARY TERM ALTHOUGH THE
PRODUCTION WAS NOT MARKED OWING TO Tm LAcK OF PIPE LNE

FAcYLrnEs.-An oil and gas "unless" lease provided for a primary

term of five years and as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced.
P, lessor, brought an action against D, lessee, to cancel the lease
contending that the lease expired by its own terms for failure to
produce oil or gas during the primary term. Within such term of
the lease a well was completed, but because of the unburnable
quality of the gas and the lack of a pipe line the well was capped
and no gas sold therefrom until seven and two-thirds years after
the end of the primary term at which time a pipe line was constructed. The court stated that while under Oklahoma law there
is no condition precedent requiring production within the primary
term to extend the lease beyond it, there is an implied covenant to
operate the lease with reasonable diligence and this includes a duty
to market the production. Held, that D had not been guilty of such
lack of diligence as would forfeit the lease and there had not been a
delay of an unreasonable time in marketing. The dissent stated that
it is a matter of "conjecture" as to whether or not the Oklahoma
courts would apply the "rule of reason" to extend a lease under
these facts, and even if a test of reasonableness were applied, nine
and one-half years after the completion of the well and seven and
two-thirds years after the expiration of the fixed term was too long
a time and therefore unreasonable. Bristol v. Colorado Oil and Gas
Corp., 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955).
The paramount rule in construing contracts is to ascertain
the intent of the parties at the time the contract was formed. In
the principal case no provision was made for a delay in securing a
market so the duty devolved upon the court to ascertain the mutual
intent concerning this question. When oil or gas is produced in
paying quantities there is an implied covenant to use due diligence
to market the product. Strangg v. Hicks;,78 Okla. 1, 188 Pac. 847
(1920). It has been stated that, "[t]he general rule is ...where
production results from drilling operations and the operator is unable to market the product immediately on account of lack of
an available market or of pipe line connections, no forfeiture results if, by the exercise of due diligence on the part of the operator,
the well is equipped and a market is obtained within a reasonable
time." Christiansonv. Champlin Refining Co., 169 F.2d 207 (10th
Cir. 1948). Although the Christianson case stated that fifteen
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months was not an unreasonable time, the test laid down was one
of reasonableness to be determined by looking at all the facts and
circumstances and not one of time alone. The court in the principal
case recognizes that an unduly long time has passed but states that
the lessee should still be given the opportunity to bring forth any
facts that may justify this delay. D in answering showed that it
used due diligence in attempting to secure a market, there was good
faith, there was a lack of pipe line facilities, the drilling took place
in "wildcat" territory, there was no drainage, and although not a
waiver the fact that the plaintiff accepted without protest the pro
rata share of the rentals or royalties notwithstanding that he refused
to execute the annual shut-in royalty agreements which his cotenants
signed. That the length of time is an important fact is not disputed,
but it should not be controlling. "[O] ne year may be unreasonable
in some circumstances, and ten years reasonable in others." Trust
Co. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 192 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1951). It has
been often stated that the principles of equity are to be applied to
a suit for the cancellation of a lease and the final determination depends upon the sound discretion of the court. McKenna v. Nichlos,
193 Olda. 526, 145 P.2d 957 (1944).
Although there is authority for the plaintiff's contention that
the lease expired by its own terms for failure to produce oil or gas
within the primary term, the court was justified in treating this as a
forfeiture proceeding. The completion of a well to production
within the definite term creates an interest in the land of the lessee.
Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
The discovery of oil or gas vests title in the lessee; however, this
right may be lost. Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64
S.E. 886 (1909). There is an ancient equity maxim to the effect
that "equity abhors forfeitures." As a result of this maxim a heavy
burden is placed on the lessor to show that the lessee was guilty of
such acts as would permit a forfeiture to be decreed.
That the court reached an expedient result which was equitable
to both parties is strongly supported when we look at the following
considerations. The lessee took a tremendous financial risk, over
three-fourths of a million dollars in the principal case; and before he
can receive any return on his investment his lease may be cancelled.
Because the land has been partially developed the lessor could make
a new lease on much More favorable terms so that he would be
seeking a cancellation at the slightest provocation. However, the
courts should be careful not to allow the lessee to tie up the lessor's
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land for speculative purposes without the lessors getting some return. In the principal case the annual shut-in royalty agreements
provided for "rental or royalty" so that the lessor was getting some
consideration for the use of his land. Most gas leases provide for a
flat yearly rental as a result of which the lessor receives a return
whether the gas is produced or not and suffers no hardship while
the lessee is awaiting a market to develop. Another important factor, mentioned in the principal case, is that while oil may be taken
from the ground and stored in tanks the only important storage
place for gas is under the ground where it is found. It must remain
there until a pipe line is connected to take it to market.
If this question is ever raised in West Virginia, our court would
probably reach a result similar to the one in the present case upon
the authority of South Penn. Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 488,
76 S.E. 961 (1912). There the lease provided for a term of ten
years and as long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is produced. During the definite term not more than one barrel of oil
was produced. However the court extended the lease beyond the
fixed term stating that, "as long as oil or gas is produced" means
"as long as the premises are diligently and efficiently operated, provided minerals shall have been discovered within the fixed term."
This appears to be broad enough to allow the result reached in the
present case. Although this case has been severely criticised,
2 S MINIMS, "OIL AND GAS § 300 (2d ed. 1954), it is law today in
West Virginia. In McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va.
345, 135 S.E. 238 (1926), a lease was continued after the expiration of the fixed term although the well was shut in for want of a
market. Here the lessor was receiving payments throughout this
time. See

DoNLEY, LAW OF COAL, OIL AND GAS IN WEST VIGINIA

§ § 70, 72 (1951), for the West Virginia cases touching upon this question.
Although there are situations that cannot be foreseen the problem in the present case has arisen before and could have been
easily avoided by including a detailed provision in the lease expressing the intention of the parties as to this contingency. A strong
argument may someday be made, as suggested by the dissent in the
principal case, to the effect that the omission of such a provision
shows that the parties did not intend to extend the lease beyond
the fixed term in this factual situation.
It is submitted that the court in the principal case by the
application of the "rule of reason" reached the more desirable
AN
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result. Instead of harsh, fixed rules of law the court looked to the
facts and circumstances of the case to determine where the equities
lay.
M. J. P.
Torrs - VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF DuTy - FlimIAL ToRT
CLIs Acr.-Action by barge charterer and others, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for damages sustained when a tug went
aground and the cargo on a barge towed by it was damaged allegedly because of the negligent operation of a lighthouse by the
coast guard. The coast guard personnel failed to check the equipment and to make the necessary repairs, and they failed to give
warning that the light was not operating. Held, that the coast guard,
having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use
due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to use due care to discover failure of the light, to repair the same, or to give warning that it was not functioning; and if
the coast guard failed to do so and damages were thereby caused to
the petitioners, the United States was liable under the Tort Claims
Act. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 122 (1955)
(5-4 decision).
The old common law maxim that the 'Idngcould do no wrong"
has been disregarded in the United States. Here the sovereign can
be sued, but not without consent. In 1946 the Federal Tort Claims
Act was enacted. The relevant provisions are: ". . . the district
courts... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages.., for injury or loss
... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1952). "The United States shall be liable...
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior
to judgment or for punitive damages." Id. § 2674. Negligence was
admitted in the principal case. The question was whether this was
a type of negligence for which the government had consented to
be sued.
In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), it was held
that members of the armed services injured through the negligence
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